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Abstract: Capital adequacy supervision is the main trend of the current global 
finance supervision. This paper, based on the evaluation of the related reference 
papers, had constructed a utility function of commercial bank, introduced inter-period 
return and interest rate to discuss the influence of capital idiosyncrasy to commercial 
bank’s risk preference and credit scope through portfolio management theory, and 
also come up with some suggestions to the in-depth reform of China's commercial 
bank. This paper believes that the bank with different capital idiosyncrasy will 
represent different actions and options while facing the same capital adequacy 
requirement. So, it might not be enough to be adapt with restriction index of Basel 
Accord passively, the key point of introducing capital supervision system of our 
commercial banks is to improve the related banks' capital idiosyncrasy and undertake 
deeper reforms. 
Key words: Capital Constrain, Capital Idiosyncrasy， Risk Preference, Lending 
Behavior 
 
Résumé: La supervision adéquate capitale est la principale tendance de celle de la 
finance mondiale actuelle. Cette mémoire, basée sur l’évaluation des mémoires 
référentielle connexe, avait construit une fonction utile de la banque commerciale, 
introduite le retour de l’inter-période et le taux d’intérêt afin de discuter de l’influence 
de l’idiosyncrasie capitale pour la préférence risquée et les possibilités du crédit de la 
banque commerciale par la théorie de la gestion de portefeuille, et aussi de fournir 
d’idées la réforme en détail de la banque commerciale de la Chine. Cette mémoire 
croit que la banque avec différentes idiosyncrasies capitales représentera différentes 
actions et options en faisant face à la même condition adéquate capitale. Aussi ne 
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peut-elle pas être suffisant d’être adaptée avec un index restreint de l’accord Bâle 
passivement, le point clé de l’introduction du système de la supervision capitale de 
nos banques commerciales est à améliorer l’idiosyncrasie capitale de la banque 
connexe et à entreprendre les réformes profondes. 
Mots-Clés: contrainte capitale, idiosyncrasie capitale, préférence risquée, 
comportement dirigent 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the successive implementation of 1988 and 2004 Basel Accord, capital adequacy 
supervision has become the main trend of current global financial supervision, at the same time, 
risk capital supervision system has become the core of bank supervision.  
Generally speaking, capital supervision would induce credit crunch in commercial banks.  
Koehn and Santomero（19804）, Kim and Santomero（19885）believed that fixed capital 
adequacy ratio would limit the risk return frontier and compel banks to choose a portfolio of 
higher risk to compensate for their loss, consequently, banks’ credit scale declined.  The static 
model designed by Holmstrom and Tirole（19976）indicated that a high level of asset caused by 
capital supervision would decrease credit scale and deteriorate economic depression.  Blum 
and Hellwig（19957）argued that, asset of banks would affect the increase of loans.  Diamond 
and Rajan（20008）、Chami and Cosimano（20019）believed that capital supervision could cause 
credit crunch. 
Unfortunately, the data show something different from models. Some scholars insist that 
capital supervision would induce credit crunch.  According to their empirical study of banks in 
the United States, Hancock and Wilcox（199810）found that banks’ credit supply was reduced 
by capital adequacy supervision.  G. Choi（200011）‘s study on Korea indicated that if the 
supervision were carried out after financial crisis, loan supply of banks would be reduced By 
analyzing statistics from 15 developing countries, Chiuri, Ferri and Majnoin（200112） 
concluded that capital adequacy supervision was indeed a handicap to banks in developing 
countries, especially those with weaker capital ratio However, some scholars hold different 
opinions to the effect of capital supervision. Keely and Furlong （199013）, studying on statistics 
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of America and some other western countries, found that credit crunch was not obvious to 
banks which were supervised between 1981 and 1986.  
Whether capital supervision would induce credit crunch or not?  Current research cannot 
give us a satisfactory answer.  As far as we are concerned, the contradiction between models 
and data lies in the hypotheses which regarded all the banks as the same type and had the same 
reaction to the capital supervision.  However, since Capital Idiosyncrasy existing, banks should 
have distinct reactions and lending behaviors when facing capital supervision.  This effect 
would be more obvious when inter-period factors involved. 
This paper, based on the framework of analysis of Kopechy and VanHoose（200414）, Liu 
Bin（200515）, and Huang Xian(200516), sets up a new utility function, introduces inter-period 
return and interest structure, analyzes factors and reasons that may affect the real return with 
NPV, classifies commercial banks into different capital type, discusses the risk preference 
when capital idiosyncrasy banks facing capital supervision 
 
2.  ASSUME  
 
Bank’s balance sheet is  
EDLF +=+ . 
F is risk-free asset, mainly made up of government bond, of which the risk rated ratio is 0%.  
L is loan, of which the risk rated ratio is 100%.  According to Basel Accord, capital adequacy 
ratio of banks (represented byΦ ) should be higher than 8%, but banks usually have different 
capital adequacy ratios due to capital idiosyncrasy. Capital adequacy ratio equals to 
Φ==×+× L
E
LF
E
%100%0 . 
Assume banks could invest in inter-period.  At t=0, portfolio is 0F  and 0L , and capital is 0E . 
This investing situation couldn’t be changed at t=0, however, the bank could change it at t=1, 
and the new portfolio is 1F  and 1L , and capital is 1E .  Generally, banks are not willing to 
change their portfolio which can bring return, because these changes will increase their costs, 
but sometimes, capital supervision would compel banks to change it because of the poor capital 
ratio. 
The utility function of a bank is  
111 ErFrLr EfL −+=Θ , 
fr is return of risk-free asset. Assume 1F  is a government bond with one year maturity.  
Then the risk-free rate is 1)1( 1 −+rδ , where 1r  is the interest rate, and δ is the discount rate. 
In the utility function, net gain of 1L  is Lr . 1L  is a loan that should pay each month equally, 
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with an interest rate of 2r , a period of n years, and a discount rate of δ .  Suppose there are two 
risks. The first one is default risk， and the second one is market risk.  If x% is default rate, the 
loss caused by default risk is 22)1( Lrx− .  And if fr is return of risk-free asset, the loss of loan 
caused by risk market is 1)( Lrr fmL −β , in it, Lβ is the risk of bank, mr  is average gain of 
market portfolio.  Because NPV of bank loan is nominal gain subtracting default risk and 
market risk, we can get  
[ ] 121 11)( LrrxrLr fmLL ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−−−= δδβ Ignored cost of operation management, utility 
function can be written as follows, 
[ ]
111
12
]1)1([        
1
1
)(
ErFr
Lrrxr
E
fmL
−−++
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−−=Θ
δ
δ
δβ  
 
3.  MODEL AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In face of Capital Adequacy Regulation, different types of banks may pose different reactions.  
With the purpose of explaining this phenomenon, we use the basic analytical structure of K＆
V（2004）and Liu Bin（2005）for references.  We divide the banks into three categories: Type 
A is fluid capital idiosyncrasy banks with low capital adequacy ratio, called FCL-Banks. For 
this kind of bank, their capital adequacy ratio doesn’t meet the requirements of Capital 
Adequacy Regulation, while through self-adjustment, the ratio could increase above the 
requirement within a short period; Type B is rigid capital idiosyncrasy banks with low capital 
adequacy ratio, called RCL-Banks.  For this kind of bank, their capital adequacy ratio doesn’t 
meet the requirements of Capital Adequacy Regulation, and the ratio can’t reach the 
requirement in a short time. Type C is selective capital idiosyncrasy banks with high capital 
adequacy ratio, called SCH-Banks which is equal to or above the capital adequacy regulation.  
 
3.1 Type A, FCL-Banks 
Under the strict capital adequacy regulation, FCL-Banks intend to maximize their profits.  This 
process can be mathematically expressed as: calculate the maximum ofΘ , subject to Φ≥
1
1
L
E .  
In this line programming, banks’ new capital adequacy ratio 
1
1
L
E  should be at least equal to or 
above the requirement of the regulatory authorities. ε ( 0>ε ) represents the extra capital 
adequacy ratio above the requirements of the regulatory authorities. And then the line 
programming is as follows: 
[ ]
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Set up the Lagrange function, achieve the maximum: 
[ ]
])([]1)1([
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⎧ −−−−=Θ  
Therefore， the maximum of the banks’ utility will achieve in the following equations: 
[ ]
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
=+Φ−
=+−
=+Φ−−−−−
0)(
0
0)(1
1
)(
11
2
LE
r
rrxr
E
fmL
ε
λ
ελδ
δβ
By deduction, achieve equation（1）: 
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Observing from equation（1）：the dividend on the right hand side is above zero， so when 
the denominator is greater than zero， then 0
1
1 >∂∂EL , that is to say: as 1E  increases, 1L has the 
tendency to go up, when the denominator on the right hand side of equation is smaller than 
zero， and then 0
1
1 <∂∂EL ，that is to say: as 1E  grows ， 1L  has the tendency to decrease.  
Meanwhile， because the denominator on the right side of the equation can not be equal to zero, 
1
1
E
L
∂
∂ must be either greater or smaller than zero, which means 1E  will either go up or go down 
when 1L  changes.  
Investigating the economic meaning of equation（1）: the denominator of equation（1）
will be smaller than zero, which leads to adverse movement of 1E  and 1L  on the following 
conditions: when the economy is in recession, the loan recovery  rate is low (x is small), the 
interest rate of loan is low( 2r is small), the operational risk of commercial banks increases 
( Lβ increases), the yield of risk-free security which is secured by the state is low ( fr is low), 
the discount rate of future cash flows is low (δ is low) and so on.  All of these mean that when 
economy is in recession, the regulatory authorities will heighten the standard of capital 
adequacy regulation, this will lead to the credit contraction of FCL-Banks.  In the same way we 
could deduct and explain that when denominator of equation（1）is greater than zero, the 
movement of 1E  and 1L , their economic meaning. Based on these, we conclude that: 
Proposition1:  When economy is in recession, facing the requirement of increasing the 
capital adequacy ratio of the regulatory authorities, FCL-Banks are less willing to lend.  It will 
lead to credit contraction. 
Proposition2:  When economy is in boom, facing the requirement of increasing the capital 
adequacy ratio of the regulatory authorities, FCL-Banks are more willing to lend.  It will lead to 
the expansion of credit. 17 
                                                        
17 If there are many banks with the same capital idiosyncrasy, will they have individual differences? We can simply 
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3.2  Type B, RCL-Banks 
In the context of requirements of heightening the capital adequacy requirement, how do 
RCL-Banks on one hand increase the capital adequacy ratio; on the other hand, maximize their 
profit?  In mathematics, this can be demonstrated as follows: 
[ ]
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To solve this problem, for 1E  is rigid and can’t adjust in response to the change of 1L , so 
we can’t make use of Lagrange function to calculate
1
1
E
L
∂
∂  or analyze the relationship between 1E  
and 1L . Under this circumstance, banks, as a rational entity, have three ways to increase profits 
Θ : First, banks could make more loans (increase 1L ), While just increasing loans, with capital 
E  staying the same could only reduce to the decline of capital adequacy ratio, so this method is 
invalid.  Second, banks could make more investment on risk-free securities which will generate 
more profits, but it fails to heighten the capital adequacy ratio.  Third, banks could make 
adjustment of their asset portfolio. The banks decrease their loan activities and make more 
investment on risk-free asset( 1F ). The revenues generated from the risk-free assets will make 
up for the losses of decline of loan activities.  Thus, the capital adequacy ratio will increase at 
the expense of loss of qualified customers, substantial cost of adjustment, as well as the 
negative impact on the macro-economy. We conclude that: 
Proposition 3:  For RCL-Banks, the heightening of the capital adequacy ratio will lead to 
credit contraction.  
 
3.3  Type C, SCH-Banks 
In our above-mentioned division of the banks, for the last type of banks (type C), what will be 
their reactions to the heightening of the capital adequacy requirement and how will they 
maximize their profit?  And what will these behaviors affect the credit activities? 
Mathematically, this process can be expressed to achieve the maximum of 
111 ErFrLr EfL −+=Θ  
In accordance with the linear feature of the utility function, in order to achieve the 
                                                                                                                                                              
lending, and then if 21 ββ > ，we cam deduce [ ] [ ] 11)(11)( 2212 −−−−
<
−−−− δ
δβδ
δβ fm
E
fm
E
rrxr
r
rrxr
r
, it demonstrates that 
when 1E  goes up， though Bank A and Bank B will both conduct credit contraction， while Bank A with greater risk 
coefficient 1β  has smaller degree of credit contraction in comparison with Bank B. In the similar way, we can 
achieve that when economy is in boom, FCL-Banks will be more willing to lend, banks with large risk coefficient 
will have larger degree of credit expansion compared to banks with small risk coefficient. In this way, for 
RCL-Banks and SCH-Banks, we can also conclude their individual features with different risk coefficient.  The 
process is omitted here. In brief, capital adequacy requirement will bring a variety of changes to the commercial 
banks, theoretical research will make the empirical investigation and conclusions more meaningful  
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maximum, in context of lack of sources for investment in bank industry, rational behaviors for 
banks are: on basis of maintaining or shrinking scale of capital, make adjustment on asset 
portfolio to increase revenues.  The adjustment can be realized by enlarging the percentage of 
loan activities or improving the shares of investment on risk-free assets.  It is decided by the 
risk preference of the senior management whether to take the former or the latter. If the 
managers believe in their ability and would like to take the risk, they will conduct more loan 
activities; if the managers are risk-adverse , the bank will choose risk-free asset. The banks can 
also design a portfolio making a balance between the former and latter.  These choices can not 
only meet the requirements of regulatory authorities, but also maximize the profit.  They are 
incentive compatibility. While, currently in China, on one hand, the bank industry has not 
cultivated a scientific sense of risk; on the other hand, the government continuously 
implements credit policies, accompanying the potential political indicators of achievement to 
the senior management of the banks.  Therefore, the impacts of the capital adequacy 
regulations on the credit behaviors of these banks are uncertain.  
Proposition 4:  For SCL-Banks, the impact of capital adequacy regulation is uncertain. 
 
4.  SUGGESTIONS 
 
From the conclusions above we can see that it is truly a complicated subject to discuss the 
influence of capital adequacy supervision on commercial banks’ credit scope. Our research 
shows that, although capital adequacy supervision will surely affect the investment behavior of 
commercial banks, but the directions are still uncertain.  Capital Idiosyncrasy usually fluctuates 
with macroeconomic, and banks with different capital idiosyncrasy will represent different 
actions and options while facing the same capital adequacy requirement. It might be the 
empirical literature aiming at different areas that makes their conclusion distinct. 
By analyzing the model, we also find out that, in the process of capital supervision, the more 
flexible the capital in banks with a low capital adequacy ratio is and the more selectivity banks 
with a high capital adequacy ratio have, the better can this policy accordant with its original 
intention. From the analysis we can see that scientific logos and managing mechanism of risk 
might be the key point of commercial banks’ reform. The reform about risk managing 
mechanism should be carried out initiatively, rather than being compelled to adjust to some 
international pact passively.  The impact of administrative orders is much less effective than 
improving the Capital Idiosyncrasy of rigid capital and the formation mechanism of capital in 
banks with a low capital adequacy ratio. Credit and macro-control policy will be more effective 
if most of banks in our country are able to adjust their capital elastically or own a high capital 
adequacy ratio. 
   
 
